Unofficially, using mainly common sense as our guide, we can think of two definitions of terrorism.
The term gets thrown around rather freely, and is used by governments to police and invalidate a wide range of individual and social behaviors.
Definition #1: Deliberate Attacks on Civilians
Part of the terrorist playbook is to exact maximum psychological damage, and in this definition attacks on civilians are a core part of the strategy. This behavior compensates for a lack of resources and abilities and the ineffective amount of tactical damage that a typical non-state resistance movement might employ.
By horrifying people, which is best done by deliberately breaking the rules of war and being as brutal as possible, a terrorist group can create outsized fear relative to their actual size, which can evolve into disproportional unrest. Yuval Noach Harari describes this as a wasp that stings a bull in a china shop.
According to this definition, a state can easily be guilty of terrorism as well. There could be a range of incentives for a country might want to strike fear into a civilian population, a top reason being to prevent further uprising and extract obedience.
However, while a terrorist organization would deliberately link themselves to an attack on civilians in order to extract the psychological capital for their cause, a state actor would prefer to create an amount of distance from the act, allowing them to hide behind plausible deniability while still achieving their desired goal.1
With this definition, Israel is definitely guilty of multiple acts of terror, not just before its founding, when it was a non-state actor, but also afterwards. Sometimes this was overt, such as its deliberate massacre of civilians in Jordan’s Qibya in 1953 (69 civilians killed) or Gaza in 1956 (over 900 people killed).
Other times they allowed others to do the dirty work for them, accomplishing their goals with none of the responsibility, such as Sabra and Shatila (thousands killed), funding Hamas, or supporting multiple nefarious regimes such as Iran and Rawanda.
Airstrikes against “power targets” that don’t create a tactical advantage and are just intended to harass or strike fear into a population should fall into this category as well, especially when these strikes undoubtedly cause civilian casualties. When a terrorist organization blows up a school it’s an act of terror, when Israel blows up a school it should be the same.2
Definition #2: Non-state Attacks
In this view, the definition of terror is any attack made by a non-state actor, period. This is the inverse of the principle pointed out by Max Weber, that the state is the only institution that is granted a legitimate monopoly on violence. Acts that would be normally considered heinous in any other circumstance are accepted under the guise of “military operations” when conducted by a state. It therefore becomes clear why statehood is such a valuable status to attain – it suddenly affords a huge amount of legitimacy to wield power and violence.
According to this view, Palestinian resistance groups will always be terrorists, regardless of who they target, and Israel will always be valid, as it is a state defending itself.3
And this might be true, but we need only point out Israel’s own pre-state militias, that should, and were, classified as terrorist organizations. The Israel Defense Forces of today are an amalgamation of “resistance groups” that, depending on their ideologies, did everything from bombing railroads and attacking police stations to massacring civilians and blowing up markets. All this in a bid for self-determination and a belief in their right to a piece of land.
One man’s terrorist is truly another man’s freedom fighter.
It behooves us, when casting broad sweeping generalizations and moral judgements, to retain a sense of nuance. How would it feel if the tables were turned, as they already have many times in the past? We so often allow means to justify ends when it fulfills our own agendas, and forget everything but implied intent when it comes to the other.
The amount of Palestinians who support violence against Israel is an oft-cited statistic in the Israeli propaganda machine. The amount of Israelis who support violence against Palestinians is cited nearly as often. And maybe this is because of, or rendered irrelevant by, the fact that Israel has been disproportionately violent against Palestinians for over 75 years regardless of whether Israelis support it or not.
- For a small resistance group, a terror attack can take a tremendous amount of time, money, and risk, and they will do anything they can to take credit for it in order to further their goals (Although even Hamas seems to be trying to distance itself from some of the heinous acts it committed on that day).
A state actor, meanwhile, needs to work less hard to terrorize a population, but at the same time usually prefers to preserve at least a semblance of civility and distance itself from the acts. A state can easily terrorize a population while simultaneously denying, diminishing, or justifying their action to the rest of the world. (Russia’s preference to make its assassinations look like suicides speaks to this point.)
In a way, the ability to terrorist a group from afar, by dropping bombs, using drones, building fences with remote controlled machine guns, while controlling the presence of journalists and international observers, is a privilege afforded to a state, allowing them to commit their atrocities at arms length in ways that neither they nor the rest of the world need to look too closely at. ↩︎ - Israel invokes the “human shield” argument ad nauseam to allow them to bomb an entire population with impunity. This is not the point of this article, but it’s worth pointing out that the IDF is also deeply embed within its civilian population – soldiers roam the streets and ride buses, reserve soldiers and officers are on call while living with their families, and Israel has bases in the middle of populated areas like Tel Aviv.
Would a Hamas suicide bombing that kills a soldier alongside 20 civilians be considered a “proportionate use of force”? Because this is Israel’s acceptable ratio on the daily (“for every junior Hamas operative that Lavender marked, it was permissible to kill up to 15 or 20 civilians“). ↩︎ - I believe that the October 7th massacre’s biggest moral failing was its attacks on civilians, and taking of civilian prisoners. Attacks on military institutions were far more justified, and should have been the sole focus of the attack.
It is unfair to the Palestinian cause to group the military and civility casualties it created into one group; it is also quite possible that Israel would have responded in a similar disproportionate fashion even if all the casualties and prisoners they took were military personnel. ↩︎